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elations  between  the  European  Union  and  Argentina  are  under  severe  strain.  For 
years, the Argentinean government has been involved in a diplomatic dispute with 
the United Kingdom over the status of the Falkland Islands (Las Islas Malvinas to the 
Argentines). It recently decided to take advantage of Spain’s current economic weakness to 
attack  a  major  Spanish  investment  in  the  country.  On  April  16th,  the  Argentinean 
government expropriated 51% of Repsol’s shares in YPF, a former state-owned oil company, 
which had been privatised in the early 1990s. This action provoked a public outcry in Madrid 
and beyond, especially in the European Commission. In this Commentary, we explore its 
longer-term impact on relations between the EU and Argentina. 
The Spanish government reacted vehemently to Argentina’s action, which was criticized by 
the  Industry Minister  José Manuel  Soria  as  “a hostile  decision  against  Repsol,  a  Spanish 
company,  and  consequently  against  Spain  and  the  Spanish  Government”.  José  García-
Margallo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointed out that the decision violated the bilateral 
agreement of 1991 on expropriations. Spain is now also looking for support from the EU 
institutions in its bilateral conflict with Argentina. 
The  EU  condemned  Argentina’s  moves  early  on.  Catherine  Ashton,  the  EU’s  High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs, said on April 17th that “this announcement is cause for 
grave concern. YPF is an important EU investment in Argentina. A takeover sends a very 
negative  signal  to  international  investors  and  it  could  seriously  harm  the  business 
environment  in  Argentina.”  The  European  Parliament  also  adopted  a  resolution  on  the 
matter,1 describing the nationalisation as dangerous for Argentina, as it would increase the 
“legal insecurity” and make investors more cautious about the security of their investments. 
Thus, the country’s economic growth could also be jeopardized. 
But the boldest action from the EU came on May 25th, when it challenged Argentina on 
import restrictions in the WTO. According to the rules of procedure, the Europeans and 
Argentineans had 60 days in which to solve the conflict. No agreement has been reached, 
however, and the EU might now request a WTO Panel to be convened in order to rule on the 
legality of Argentina’s measures. This process might result in the imposition of significant 
fines on Argentina. 
                                                   
1  European  Parliament  resolution  on  the  legal  security  of  European  investments  outside  the  European 
Union (2012/2619(RSP), 18 April 2012. 
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Another important action was taken several days later, on June 13th, when the EU revised its 
Generalised System of Preferences, resulting in an increase of duties on Argentina’s exports 
to the EU. The impact is estimated to be worth a loss of $3 billion annually in Argentinean 
exports to the EU.2 
For its part, Repsol has demanded $10 billion in compensation for the nationalization of YPF. 
The  Argentinean  government  has  refused  to  pay,  citing  among  the  reasons  the 
“environmental harm” that Repsol has inflicted on Argentina.  
On May 15th the Spanish company decided to take the first step towards legal action against 
Argentina in the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). To initiate ICSID arbitration, Repsol notified the Argentinean government that there 
is a dispute under the Treaty for Investment Promotion and Protection agreed between Spain 
and Argentina. If there is no agreement between the parties in six months, the next step will 
be  to  take  the  case  to the  ICSID.  Subsequently,  on  June  8th,  Repsol  lodged  an  appeal  of 
unconstitutionality of the YPF nationalization under the Argentinean judicial system. The 
latest move taken by the company has been to press charges against its former subsidiary in 
the  United  States  on grounds  that YPF  deliberately  failed  to  comply  with  Securities  and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements to provide investors with relevant information. 
The  situation  further  deteriorated  when  on  July  13th  the  government  in  Buenos  Aires 
unilaterally  terminated  its  fiscal  agreement  with  Spain  and  other  countries  on  avoiding 
double taxation, creating huge problems with the fiscal authorities for Spanish companies 
and entrepreneurs.  
The fall-out from the crisis in relations between the EU and Argentina could manifest itself in 
any one of several different ways, but the EU has several policy options available to it to 
respond to these developments, depending on its strategy. We explore both the possible fall-
out as well as the policy options below. 
1.  Souring investors on doing business in Argentina 
With the deterioration in the business environment, there is a real risk that international 
investors  will  turn  away  from  Argentina.  The EU  is  Argentina’s  most  important  foreign 
investor  and  its  second-most  important  trading  partner.3  Following  the  events  of  this 
summer, however, the prospects for growth of investments from the EU to Argentina are 
significantly diminished. Therefore we should expect a decrease of European FDI inflows to 
Argentina and potentially also a decrease in trade volumes. 
  The EU strategy needs to reflect a continued commitment to engage with Argentina at 
the same time that it takes all necessary steps to protect its own interests in the country. 
Accordingly, the EU should proceed with the WTO case and use it as political leverage in 
its dialogue with the Buenos Aires government to change the Argentinean foreign trade 
and investment stance. This engagement on the European side to solve the dispute in a 
legal  and  diplomatic  manner  should  seek  to  improve  Argentina’s  image  among 
international investors, which would be in the country’s best interest. At the same time, 
this strategy would be in the EU’s interest, as many of the stakeholders are European and 
they would stand to benefit from an authoritative ruling in their favour. 
                                                   
2  Martin  Kanenguiser,  “Sube  el  riesgo  de  perder  ventajas  comerciales”,  La  Nación,  29  April  2012 
(http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1469151-sube-el-riesgo-de-perder-ventajas-comerciales).  
3 The EU is Argentina’s second-largest export market after Brazil and before China and the US. The EU is 
also the biggest foreign investor in Argentina, accounting for about one-half of foreign direct investment in 
Argentina, with the EU's investment stocks in 2011 worth €49.5 billion in important areas such as telecoms, 
automotive  and  energy  (see  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/ 
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2.  Challenging Argentina’s standing in international fora 
Argentina is South America’s second largest country by land area (after Brazil), the eighth-
largest country in the world by land area and the largest among Spanish-speaking nations. 
By  virtue  of  its  size, history  and  rich  cultural  traditions,  it  is  a  member  of  nearly  every 
international diplomatic, political and economic organization. If all efforts at engagement 
prove fruitless, however, the EU’s objective could be to marginalize the country politically in 
these organizations for as long as it refuses to alter its policy.  
  Among the more controversial ideas circulating and one that has already been widely 
discussed is the removal of Argentina from the G-20. Some influential decision-makers in 
the US and the EU have called for Argentina’s continued membership in the G-20 to be 
made conditional on its “adherence to international norms of economic relations and 
commitment  to  the  rule  of  law”.4  Many  leading  newspapers  have  also  called  for 
Argentina’s expulsion from the G-20.5 There are no formal rules on G-20 membership; 
therefore any attempt to remove (suspend/replace) Argentina would require a political 
compromise  with  other  G-20  members,  most  notably  US,  Russia,  China  (all  three  of 
which are UN Security Council members, with Russia slated to chair the G-20 in 2013) 
and Brazil (a regional powerhouse). This move, however, remains rather unlikely due to 
the  probable  lack  of  unanimity  in  G-20,  but  also  undesirable  as  it would represent a 
major escalation of the conflict. 
  Other  opportunities  to  pursue  this  strategy  are  presenting  themselves  this  fall,  as 
Argentina is seeking to become a (rotating) member of the UN Security Council for the 
2013-14 term, as well as a member of the UN Human Rights Council for 2013-15.6 The 
success of this tactic, however, would require the formation of an international coalition 
in support of such moves.  
  The  problems  between  the  EU  and  Argentina  are  also  expected  to  be  prominently 
addressed during the upcoming EU-LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) Summit, 
foreseen for January 2013 in Santiago, Chile.  
  Even  in  the  extreme  situation  in  which  Argentina  would  refuse  to  obey  the  WTO 
decision,  the  EU  has  other  means  at  its  disposal  to  punish  its  partner.  The  sanctions 
would have to be financially severe for the Buenos Aires government, and could include, 
for example, the freezing of Argentinean assets in Europe. 
3.  EU investment agreement with Argentina 
A total of 19 member states (plus Croatia) have bilateral investment agreements with the 
Republic of Argentina.7 Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU obtained exclusive competence 
                                                   
4 “Lugar calls to suspend Argentina from G20”, Press Release of US Senator Richard Lugar, 14 May 2012 
(http://lugar.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=336772). See also letter of Martin Callanan, MEP and leader 
of the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament, to High Representative 
Catherine Ashton on 20 April 2012 (http://ecrgroup.eu/?p=6360).  
5 Among others, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The Economist; see for example: “The 
Argentine Model: Why not expel a thieving Buenos Aires from the G-20?”, Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2012 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304432704577349830438299066.html). 
6 The UN Security Council rotating members are pre-decided on a regional basis to ensure fair geographical 
representation and confirmed in the UN General Assembly by a 2/3 majority. However, a unified European 
(EU and other like-minded countries) approach could result in Argentina’s failure to obtain 2/3 support. 
Such a development would be a major diplomatic defeat for the Argentinian government. The Human 
Rights Council members are elected by a absolute majority in the UN General Assembly. 
7 The only EU countries that do not have a bilateral investment agreement with Argentina are Cyprus, 
Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. More  information is available on the 4 | LLAUDES & KACZYŃSKI 
 
in the field of investment relations with third countries, but until a new EU investment treaty 
with  Argentina  is  reached  (which  currently  is not  on  the  agenda), the  previous  bilateral 
agreements remain in force.   
  In order to be able to better serve its interests, the EU should seek a new EU-Argentina 
investment treaty (which would replace the 19 bilateral agreements between EU states 
and Argentina). This agreement, however, should be made conditional on the solution of 
the pending WTO case. Once the current conflicts are solved, the new investment treaty 
can be negotiated. If such an agreement could be reached, it would probably prove the 
most promising channel for inducing change in Argentina’s behaviour and respect for 
international rule of law. 
4.  EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement 
The EU launched the first talks on a regional free trade agreement (FTA) with the Mercosur 
countries  in  1995.8  The  primary  economic  issue  of  contention  has  been  agricultural 
subsidies.9  Recent  internal  developments  within  Mercosur  have  given  the  EU  cause  for 
concern, including the suspension of Paraguay as a member and the inclusion of Venezuela 
as  a  full  member.  This  latest  crisis  involving  Argentina  could  be  yet  another  challenge, 
effectively putting on hold the negotiations aimed at creating a free trade area. 
  Clearly,  the  entire  regional  strategy  based  on  developing  inter-regional  FTA  needs 
further reflection by the EU institutions. Both the Council and the Commission need to 
examine whether region-to-region free trade is at all feasible. If not, as seems to be the 
case, then a new strategy could be to focus on bilateral FTA negotiations or multi-party 
talks. 
  The  EU’s  policy  towards  the  Andean  Community  (composed  of  Bolivia,  Colombia, 
Ecuador  and  Peru)  has  undergone  a  similar  change  in  strategy.  Following  intensive 
negotiations on an FTA between the EU and the Andean Community, the talks were 
suspended in 2008. The region-to-region process was replaced by a set of multi-party 
FTA  negotiations  between  the  EU  and  three  countries  from  the  region  (Ecuador, 
Colombia and Peru). In 2010, a tri-party FTA agreement was signed between the EU and 
Peru and Colombia. 
*** 
These examples clearly show that not only are the EU’s relations with Argentina at stake, but 
the EU’s international credibility depends on finding an effective solution to the crisis. The 
EU needs to defend its principles (i.e. rule of law) with all the economic, diplomatic and 
political clout it can muster. Inaction will be severely penalized by further deterioration in 
the respect accorded to international norms in Argentina and elsewhere. At the same time, 
strong EU engagement to solve the problem should bring positive effects. 
                                                                                                                                                               
website  of  the  Organization  of  American  States  (http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/ARG/ 
ARGBITs_e.asp). 
8 The Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South) is an economic and political agreement 
among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
9  See  Andreas  Schneider,  “The  EU-Mercosur  Free  Trade  Agreement:  The  Implications  for  Trade  in 
Agriculture”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 107, CEPS, Brussels, 21 June 2006.  